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Abstract	
This	study	provides	an	overview	of	policies	affecting	competition	amongst	hospitals	and	GPs	
in	 five	European	countries:	 France,	Germany,	Netherlands,	Norway	and	Portugal.	Drawing	
on	 the	 policies	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 described	 in	 five	 case	 studies,	 we	 find	 both	
similarities	and	differences	in	the	approaches	adopted.		Constraints	on	patients’	choices	of	
provider	have	been	relaxed	but	countries	differ	in	the	amount	and	type	of	information	that	
is	provided	in	the	public	domain.		Hospitals	are	increasingly	paid	via	fixed	prices	per	patient	
to	 encourage	 them	 to	 compete	 on	 quality	 but	 prices	 are	 set	 in	 different	 ways	 across	
countries.	 They	 can	 be	 collectively	 negotiated,	 determined	 by	 the	 political	 process,	
negotiated	 between	 insurers	 and	 providers	 or	 centrally	 determined	 by	 provider	 costs.	
Competition	amongst	GPs	varies	across	countries	and	is	limited	in	some	cases	by	shortages	
of	providers	or	restrictions	on	entry.	There	are	varied	and	innovative	examples	of	selective	
contracting	 for	 patients	with	 chronic	 conditions	 aimed	at	 reducing	 fragmentation	of	 care.	
Competition	authorities	do	generally	have	jurisdiction	over	mergers	of	private	hospitals	but	
assessing	the	potential	 impact	of	mergers	on	quality	remains	a	key	challenge.	Overall,	 this	
study	highlights	a	rich	diversity	of	approaches	towards	competition	policy	in	healthcare.	
Keywords:	Competition;	patient	choice;	hospitals;	GPs;	quality.	
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1.	Introduction	
Governments	have	introduced	elements	of	competition	in	the	health	sector	across	several	
European	 countries.	 Competition	 is	 a	 multifaceted	 process	 whereby	 producers	 strive	 to	
attract	customers	from	their	rivals	by	providing	a	more	appealing	combination	of	price	and	
quality.	 In	conventional	markets	this	process	may	 lead	to	greater	efficiency	to	keep	prices	
down,	and	consumers	will	benefit	via	lower	prices,	products	that	better	suit	their	needs	and	
a	 greater	 variety	 of	 products.	 Patients	may	 also	 place	 an	 intrinsic	 value	 on	 having	 a	 choice	 of	
provider	(Dixon	et	al	2010).		
Healthcare	markets	differ	in	that	“consumers”	(patients)	are	usually	insulated	from	costs	by	
third-party	payers	operating	 through	public	or	private	 insurance	and	healthcare	providers	
may	 compete	 for	 the	 business	 of	 an	 insurer,	 rather	 than	 for	 patients.	 Depending	 on	 the	
objectives	 of	 the	 insurer	 and	 the	 contracts	 they	 are	 offered,	 providers	 may	 not	 be	
concerned	with	 attracting	more	 patients.	 Not	 only	 the	 target	 of	 competition	 but	 also	 its	
mechanisms	are	different	in	health	care.	If	prices	are	set	by	the	insurer	then	providers	can	
only	compete	on	quality.	But	patients	may	find	it	difficult	to	judge	the	quality	of	healthcare.		
Hence,	the	question	“what	do	we	expect	or	want	of	competition?”	is	not	so	easily	answered	
in	healthcare	 settings,	 and	 the	analogy	with	other	 sectors	may	 fail.	Within	 the	healthcare	
sector,	institutional	details	matter	and	differ	across	services	and	countries.		
The	diversity	 of	 institutional	 details	 and	 concepts	 of	 competition	motivate	 this	 study.	We	
illustrate	how	policies	affecting	competition	have	been	implemented	and	promoted	in	five	
countries:	 France,	Germany,	 the	Netherlands,	Norway	and	Portugal.		We	 restrict	attention	
to	 primary	 (GP)	 and	 secondary	 (hospital)	 services,	 since	 arrangements	 for	 other	 services,	
especially	pharmaceuticals,	raise	novel	but	separate	issues.			
Generally	 policy	 toward	 competition	 in	 healthcare	 markets	 appears	 to	 be	 based	 on	
acceptance	of	the	argument	that	competition	is	potentially	beneficial	in	driving	down	costs	
and	 improving	quality.	 That	 argument	 receives	 some,	 though	not	 complete,	 endorsement	
from	economic	models	of	healthcare	delivery.	In	particular,	most	models	suggest	that	when	
providers	 face	 regulated	 prices	 greater	 competition	 will	 drive	 up	 quality	 (Gaynor	 2006;	
Brekke	 et	 al	 2014).	 There	 is	 a	 general	 move	 towards	 introducing	 policies	 intended	 to	
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increase	 competition	but	 just	 as	 there	 is	 a	diversity	of	what	exactly	 competition	 is	 across	
different	settings,	there	is	also	a	variety	of	policy	responses.		
The	 next	 sections	 outline	 and	 discuss	 the	 results	 from	 the	 case	 studies,	 reflecting	 the	
diversity	 of	 country	 settings	 and	 healthcare	 systems,	 the	 healthcare	 services	 to	 which	
policies	have	been	applied,	the	types	of	policies	and	existing	evidence.	We	are	careful	not	to	
use	 the	 term	 competition	 policy	 because	 this	 is	 often	 synonymous	 with	 controls	 over	
mergers	based	on	antitrust	 law.	 Instead	we	refer	more	broadly	 to	policies	which	enhance	
competition,	for	example	relaxing	constraints	on	patient	choice	of	provider	or	encouraging	
providers	 to	 compete	 on	 quality	 by	 ensuring	 that	 their	 revenue	 increases	 if	 they	 attract	
more	patients.		
	
2.	Materials	and	methods	
We	draw	on	detailed	case	studies	in	five	countries	(France,	Germany,	Netherlands,	Norway	
and	 Portugal)	 chosen	 to	 reflect	 differences	 in	 financing	 arrangements	 (social	 insurance	
versus	tax-based	systems),	provider	ownership,	regulatory	frameworks,	gatekeeping	by	GPs,	
and	 patients’	 ability	 to	 choose	 a	 provider.	 The	 case	 studies	were	written	 by	 independent	
academics	following	a	common	template	and	constitute	the	remainder	of	this	Special	Issue	
of	Health	Policy.		
The	 template	 asked	 authors	 to:	 focus	 on	 primary	 and	 secondary	 care;	 identify	 the	
dimensions	 over	 which	 providers	 compete;	 define	 relevant	 markets;	 investigate	 the	
interplay	between	competition	and	patient	choice;	explain	the	role	of	antitrust	authorities;	
review,	 synthesise	 and	 analyse	 evidence,	 including	 academic	 and	 grey	 literature;	 describe	
and	analyse	 the	 role	of	private	providers	and	public-private	partnerships;	 assess	 intended	
and	 unintended	 consequences;	 and	 explore	 how	 competition	 interacts	 with	 initiatives	
aimed	 at	 improving	 coordination	 between	 primary	 and	 secondary	 care.	 The	 case	 studies	
were	presented	at	a	conference	in	April	2016	and	each	discussed	by	an	invited	policymaker	
from	the	relevant	country.		
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Despite	considerable	 international	policy	 interest	 in	 the	role	of	competition	 in	health	care	
(OECD	2012),	the	published	empirical	evidence	is	mixed	and	based	mainly	on	the	US	and	UK	
(OHE	 2012,	 Gaynor	 and	 Town	 2011).	 US	 studies	 are	 also	 often	 difficult	 to	 translate	 to	
publicly-funded	 systems.	There	 is	 very	 limited	evidence	 in	published	 literature	 from	other	
countries.	This	 study	 fills	a	gap	 in	knowledge,	and	overcomes	 language	and	other	barriers	
that	 impede	 knowledge	 transfer	 about	 experience	 in	 other	 countries.	A	brief	 overview	of	
salient	features	of	healthcare	systems	and	policies	is	provided	in	Table	1.		
[Table	1]	
	
3.	Results:	review	of	policies	and	related	empirical	evidence	
Wider	choice	of	hospital	is	increasingly	common	
Some	 countries	 have	 relaxed	 constraints	 on	 patient	 choice	 of	 healthcare	 provider.	 In	
Norway	from	2001	patients	were	given	the	right	to	choose	their	hospital	rather	than	being	
referred	 to	 the	 closest	 hospital.	 Information	 on	 waiting	 time	 for	 selected	 procedures	 is	
provided	 and	 since	 2012	 hospital	 quality	 indicators	 have	 been	 published.	 In	 2015	 patient	
choice	 was	 reinforced	 by	 removing	 constraints	 on	 hospital	 volumes	 and	 allowing	 private	
providers	to	treat	publicly-funded	patients.	Patients	are	now	allowed	to	choose	hospitals	in	
other	regions,	with	the	home	region	paying	the	DRG-price	to	the	receiving	region,	resulting	
in	 increased	 mobility	 across	 regions	 (Ringard	 et	 al	 2006).	 Patient	 choice	 of	 hospital	 is	
responsive	 to	 waiting	 times	 and	 greater	 choice	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 marked	
reduction	in	waiting	times	(Ringard	and	Hagen	2011).		
Patients	 have	 traditionally	 had	 free	 choice	 of	 hospital	 in	 France.	 Recent	 policies	 have	
facilitated	hospital	 choice	by	providing	public	 information	on	process	measures	of	 quality	
and	hospital	 activity	 (Chone	2016).	 The	website	 http://www.scopesante.fr/	 	 has	 over	 450	
indicators	 including	 generic	 process	 measures,	 such	 as	 hospital-acquired	 conditions	 and	
catering	 services,	 and	 condition	 specific	 measures	 (eg	 acute	 myocardial	 infarction,	
haemodialysis).	Activity	indicators	include	number	of	stays,	length	of	stay	and	the	C-section	
rate.	Health	outcomes	are	not	included	due	to	concerns	over	risk	adjustment	and	potential	
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strategic	response	by	hospitals,	such	as	underreporting	of	negative	outcomes.	 In	2015	the	
site	had	340,000	visitors.		
In	 the	 Netherlands	 the	 government	 has	 introduced	 mandatory	 publication	 of	 hospital	
waiting	 times,	 standardized	 mortality	 ratios	 and	 other	 outcomes	 (Shut	 and	 Varkevisser	
2016).	Evidence	suggests	that	angioplasty	patients	are	more	likely	to	choose	hospitals	with	a	
good	 (overall	 and	 cardiology)	 reputation	 and	 low	 readmissions	 after	 treatment	 for	 heart	
failure	(Varkevisser	et	al	2012).	Patient	choice	of	hospital	for	hip	replacement	is	affected	by	
information	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 on	 reputation	 and	waiting	 times,	 as	well	 as	 travel	 time	
(Beukers	et	al	2014).	
In	Germany	 hospitals	 are	 required	 to	publish	quality	 reports.	However,	 these	 are	 lengthy	
documents	not	easily	accessible	to	patients	and	provide	limited	information	(Kifmann	2016).	
There	 is	 no	 official	 platform	 which	 allows	 patients	 to	 compare	 hospitals,	 though	 some	
sickness	funds	provide	guidance	online.	Some	hospitals	voluntarily	publish	quality	data	and	
one	study	found	that	these	attract	more	patients	if	quality	is	above	average	(Wübker	et	al	
2010).	There	 is	also	evidence	that	coronary	bypass	patients	are	willing	to	travel	 further	to	
hospitals	with	better	reputation	(Pilny	and	Menniken	2014).	
In	 Portugal	 patients	 are	 restricted	 to	 the	 hospital	 in	 whose	 geographically-defined	
catchment	area	they	reside.	For	certain	elective	procedures	patients	can	choose	a	different	
hospital	 if	 they	wait	 longer	than	a	pre-determined	maximum.	There	 is	 limited	 information	
on	 hospital	 performance.	 The	 Health	 Regulatory	 Authority	 provides	 a	 three-star	
classification	 of	 hospitals	 based	 on	 voluntary	 assessment	 of	 public	 and	 private	 hospitals	
(Barros	2016).		
	
Hospital	competition	takes	different	forms	
In	France	private	hospitals	account	for	1,030	out	of	2,660	hospitals	and	60%	of	treatments.	
Patients	have	low	out-of-pocket	payments	covering	3%	of	hospital	expenditure.	Before	2005	
revenues	of	public	hospitals	were	determined	administratively	on	a	historical	basis.	A	DRG	
system	covering	both	public	and	private	hospitals	was	phased	 in	between	2005	and	2008.	
Although	 public	 and	 private	 hospitals	 compete	 for	 the	 same	 patients,	 DRG	 prices	 are	
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typically	higher	for	public	hospitals.	Private	clinics	have	argued	that	higher	prices	for	public	
hospitals	breaches	European	state	aid	law	(Chone	2016).		
Public	 hospitals	 seem	 to	 have	 responded	 to	 competition	 when	 the	 DRG	 payment	 was	
introduced.	Prior	to	its	introduction,	admissions	grew	less	rapidly	in	public	hospitals	than	in	
private	 hospitals	 (Chone	 et	 al	 2013).	 The	 introduction	 of	 DRG	 payment	 in	 2005-2008	
reversed	this	trend.	Public	hospitals	exposed	to	competition	from	private	hospitals	reduced	
length	of	 stay	by	4.4%	 (0.24	days),	while	no	effect	was	 found	 for	public	hospitals	without	
private	competitors.	Public	hospitals	expanded	their	catchment	areas	by	2	minutes,	about	
9%	of	patients’	median	travel	time	(22	minutes),	and	hospitals	responded	to	an	increase	in	
competitors’	quality	by	increasing	their	quality	(Chone	and	Wilner	2015).	
Although	 hospital	 prices	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 DRG	 system,	 self-employed	 physicians	 and	
specialists	 working	 in	 private	 practice	 can	 charge	 extra	 fees	 for	 patient	 consultations	 in	
excess	of	an	administrated	price.	Top-up	fees	have	doubled	between	1990	and	2010.	There	
is	some	evidence	suggesting	that	these	doctors	compete	on	price	(Chone	et	al	2014).	
The	 introduction	 of	 DRG	 payment	 has	 not	 been	without	 critics	who	 have	 suggested	 that	
competition	 will	 reduce	 coordination	 and	 synergies	 amongst	 providers	 leading	 to	missed	
opportunities	to	improve	quality	and	reduce	costs.	A	new	regulation	was	introduced	in	2016	
(Groupement	 Hospitalier	 de	 Territoire)	 to	 foster	 cooperation	 and	 integration	 of	 public	
hospitals.	Each	hospital	has	 to	belong	 to	a	group	associated	with	a	 teaching	hospital,	 and	
can	 share	 activity,	 equipment	 and	medical	 teams	with	 a	 joint	 information	 system	 (Chone	
2016).	
In	the	Netherlands	hospital	competition	has	been	a	feature	since	2000	when	DRG	payment	
replaced	fixed	budgets.	Each	patient	is	categorised	into	a	Diagnosis	Treatment	Combination	
(DTC).	 Prices	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 Dutch	 Healthcare	 Authority	 for	 DTCs	 in	 the	 so-called	 A-
segment,	which	 covers	more	 complex	 care.	 Prices	 are	negotiated	with	health	 insurers	 for	
the	 remaining	 DTCs	 in	 the	 B-segment,	 e.g.	 hip	 replacement	 and	 cataract	 surgery.	 The	 B-
segment	was	expanded	 from	10%	to	70%	between	2005	and	2012	 (Schut	and	Varkevisser	
2016).		
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Insurers	 can	 engage	 in	 selective	 contracting	 with	 hospitals	 and	 form	 limited	 provider	
networks	 in	an	attempt	to	obtain	more	favourable	prices	and	quality.	To	channel	enrolees	
to	contracted	providers	insurers	can	use	out-of-network	cost-sharing:	patients	are	not	fully	
reimbursed	if	they	choose	a	hospital	outside	the	insurer’s	network.	Since	2009	insurers	can	
waive	 the	 annual	 deductible	 if	 patients	 choose	 the	 preferred	 provider	 (Schut	 and	
Varkevisser	 2016).	 Varicose	 vein	 patients	 did	 respond	 to	 such	 financial	 incentives	 but	
cataract	 patients	 did	 not	 (Van	 der	 Geest	 and	 Varkevisser	 2015).	 Overall,	 selective	
contracting	 remains	uncommon.	 This	may	be	because	patients	question	whether	 insurers	
with	restrictive	networks	are	committed	to	provide	good	quality	care.	Moreover,	there	are	
constraints	on	the	extent	to	which	insurers	can	limit	the	reimbursement	of	non-contracted	
care	(Schut	and	Varkevisser	2016).			
There	 is	 limited	evidence	 from	 the	Netherlands	on	 the	effects	of	 hospital	 competition	on	
prices	and	quality.	One	study	suggests	that	hospital	price-cost	margins	were	lower	in	areas	
where	insurers	had	larger	(or	hospitals	had	smaller)	market	shares	(Halbersma	et	al	2011).	A	
study	 of	 cataract	 surgery	 suggests	 that	 negotiated	 prices	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 provider	
concentration	and	were	not	associated	with	quality	(Heijink	et	al	2013).		
The	 DRG	 system	 has	 raised	 concerns	 over	 total	 hospital	 expenditure.	 In	 2011	 the	
government	 introduced	 a	 macro	 budget	 instrument	 to	 guarantee	 that	 annual	 hospital	
expenditure	does	not	exceed	 the	available	budget.	 If	 it	does,	 the	government	can	 require	
hospitals	to	repay	excess	revenues	in	proportion	to	their	market	shares.	This	has	not	been	
used	 because	 of	 national	 agreements	 whereby	 stakeholders	 (insurers,	 government	 and	
providers)	 committed	 to	 an	 annual	 expenditure	 growth	 of	 1%	 for	 2014-2017.	 This	
percentage	 is	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 when	 negotiating	 block	 budgets	 with	 individual	
providers,	which	may	weaken	incentives	for	competition	(Schut	and	Varkevisser	2016).		
In	 Germany	 patients	 have	 historically	 had	 free	 choice.	 Hospitals	 are	 paid	 by	 DRGs	 and	
compete	for	patients.	DRG	tariffs	vary	by	state	and	are	determined	by	state-level	collective	
negotiations	between	 sickness	 funds	and	hospitals.	 Payers	 and	providers	 are	organized	 in	
corporatist	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Sickness	 Funds	 and	 the	 German	
Hospital	 Federation,	with	mandatory	membership	 and	 special	 legal	 status.	Quantities	 and	
services	are	negotiated	between	sickness	funds	and	hospitals	at	the	hospital	level	(Kifmann	
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2016).	 	 Hospitals	 are	 mostly	 restricted	 to	 providing	 care	 for	 inpatients	 and	 surgery	 for	
ambulatory	patients.		
Outpatient	 care	 is	 provided	 by	 specialists	 in	 private	 practices	 and	 payment	 is	 negotiated	
separately	with	 sickness	 funds	 through	 collective	 negotiations	 (Kifmann	 2016).	 Specialists	
are	 represented	 by	 17	 regional	 associations	 who	 receive	 morbidity-adjusted	 capitations	
from	the	sickness	funds	and	which	they	then	distributed	to	their	members.	Physicians	face	
target	budgets	with	 sharp	 reductions	of	payment	 if	 they	are	exceeded	 (Busse	and	Blümel	
2014).	The	boundaries	between	inpatient	and	outpatient	care	have	been	relaxed	since	2004	
and	hospitals	 can	provide	ambulatory	 care	 for	patients	with	 rare	diseases	and	 specialised	
services.	Medical	Treatment	Centres	run	by	hospitals	or	groups	of	self-employed	physicians	
have	 been	 introduced	 to	 foster	 cooperation	 across	 disciplines	 in	 providing	 outpatient	
treatment.	In	2014	there	were	2,073	medical	treatment	centres	of	which	38%	were	run	by	
hospitals.	Centres	enable	hospitals	to	prepare	patients	for	inpatient	stay,	provide	follow-up	
treatment,	and	channel	inpatients.		
Sickness	 funds	 can	 sign	 selective	 contracts	 with	 providers,	 in	 particular	 ambulatory	 care	
providers.	 Contracts	 can	 complement	 or	 substitute	 services	 agreed	 in	 collective	
negotiations.	 Selective	 contracting	 is	 intended	 to	 stimulate	 quality,	 achieve	 better	
coordination	and	 cooperation	 in	patients’	 care	and	 to	be	evidence-based	 (Kifmann	2016).	
One	example	is	Disease	Management	Programs	for	chronic	diseases	(asthma,	breast	cancer,	
COPD,	 diabetes,	 ischaemic	 heart	 disease)	which	 some	 sickness	 funds	 introduced	 in	 2002.	
Participation	 for	 patients	 is	 voluntary.	 In	 2012	 there	 were	 more	 than	 10,000	 programs	
covering	7.16	million	patients.	Ambulatory	care	providers	are	reimbursed	by	a	combination	
of	fee-for-service,	capitation	and	pay-for-performance.	The	mode	of	payment	is	negotiated	
and	contracts	are	confidential.	Evaluations	for	diabetes	type-II	reported	positive	effects	on	
patient	 outcomes	 and	 survival	 (Fuchs	 et	 al	 2014).	 An	 evaluation	 for	 COPD	 found	
improvements	 in	mortality,	morbidity	and	process	quality	but	higher	costs	 (Achelrod	et	al	
2016).	
Another	form	of	selective	contracting	is	Integrated	Care	Contracts.	These	aim	at	overcoming	
inter-sectoral	 barriers	 through	 case	 management	 and	 coordinated	 patient	 pathways.	
Contracts	cover	a	population	for	a	given	condition,	such	as	stroke	or	hip	replacement.	They	
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can	integrate	providers	horizontally	(eg	within	ambulatory	care)	or	vertically	across	sectors	
(eg	 inpatient	 and	 ambulatory	 care).	 During	 2004-2008	 1%	 of	 funding	 for	 ambulatory	
physicians	 was	 earmarked	 for	 these	 contracts.	 In	 2008-2011	 there	 were	 about	 6,400	
contracts	 and	 coverage	 increased	 from	 1.66	 to	 1.92	 million	 patients.	 Sickness	 funds	
negotiate	 with	 single	 or	 networks	 of	 providers,	 including	 rehabilitative	 care	 providers.	
Payment	can	be	fee-for-service	or	capitation.	Patient	participation	is	voluntary.	Patients	are	
committed	 to	 contracted	 providers	 but	 not	 penalised	 by	 sickness	 funds	 if	 they	 seek	
alternative	providers.	Unlike	Disease	Management	Programs,	Integrated	Care	contracts	can	
substitute	 for	 services	 included	 in	 collective	 agreements	 with	 subsequent	 transfer	
correction	from	sickness	funds	to	regional	physician	associations.	Little	is	known	about	the	
effectiveness	of	these	contracts	(Kifmann	2016).		
In	Norway	hospitals	have	been	paid	by	DRG	since	1997	as	part	of	a	mixed	payment	system	
in	which	the	price	 initially	covered	30%	of	treatment	costs.	This	share	 increased	to	40%	in	
1998,	 has	 since	 fluctuated	 between	 40%	 and	 60%,	 and	 is	 currently	 50%.	 Hospitals	 also	
receive	a	block	grant	based	on	population	demographics	of	their	health	region.	DRG	pricing	
initially	covered	only	inpatient	care	by	public	hospitals	and	was	later	extended	to	outpatient	
care	and	private	providers.	Direct	competition	for	patients	was	only	possible	after	the	2001	
patient	choice	reform.		
In	2002	 the	ownership	of	public	hospitals	was	 transferred	 from	 the	 county	 to	 the	higher-
state	level	and	hospitals	were	given	more	autonomy	and	independence.	Although	hospitals	
are	 state-owned,	 decision-making	 is	 decentralized	 to	 hospitals	 which	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
respond	 to	competition.	However,	 the	2002	ownership	 reform	 involved	mergers	of	public	
hospitals,	which	could	have	weakened	competition.		
The	 evidence	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 competition	 is	 limited.	 The	 introduction	 of	 DRG	pricing	 in	
1997	led	to	gains	in	technical	efficiency	and	increases	in	volume	(Biørn	et	al	2003).	The	2001	
patient	choice	reform	and	the	2002	hospital-status	reform	both	further	stimulated	activity.	
Volume	of	activity	was	higher	than	planned	after	2002,	leading	to	higher	deficits	(Tjerbo	and	
Hagen	 2009).	 Average	 waiting	 time	 for	 elective	 care	 was	 250	 days	 in	 1998-2000,	 but	
dropped	markedly	 after	 the	 2001-2002	 and	 stabilised	 at	 70	 days	 from	 2005.	 It	 is	 unclear	
how	much	of	this	reduction	can	be	attributed	to	competition	(Ringard	and	Hagen	2011).	
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In	Portugal	 public	 hospitals	 are	 funded	by	 global	 budgets	 calculated	on	predicted	patient	
volumes	 and	pre-determined	DRG	prices	 so	 that	 hospital	 revenue	does	not	 vary	with	 the	
number	 treated.	 Public	 hospitals	 have	 regional	 catchment	 areas	 with	 access	 defined	 by	
citizens’	residence.	Choice	for	highly-specialised	care	may	be	mediated	by	specialists.	Since	
2012	patients	waiting	longer	than	a	predetermined	time	within	a	public	hospital	can	choose	
another	accredited	public	or	private	hospital.	Critically,	 it	 is	 the	original	hospital	 that	pays	
for	 treatment,	 thus	 creating	 strong	 incentives	 to	 keep	 within	 the	 maximum.	 There	 is	
evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 policy	 contributed	 to	 reductions	 in	 waiting	 times	 across	 a	
range	 of	 treatments	 (Barros	 2013).	 Legislation	 in	 2016	 introduces	 elements	 of	 choice	 for	
elective	procedures	(Barros	2016).		
	
GP	choice	and	competition	policies	can	be	controversial	
Some	countries	have	also	expanded	the	scope	for	patient	choice	and	competition	amongst	
GPs.	In	Norway	from	2001	individuals	can	freely	choose	their	GP	and	change	GP	up	to	twice	
a	year.	GPs	can	fix	their	list	size	between	500	to	2500	patients	and	refuse	additional	patients	
once	 their	 set	 size	 is	 reached.	 The	 GP	 choice	 reform	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 change	 in	
payment	so	that	GPs	are	paid	by	capitation	plus	fee-for-service	for	consultations	and	other	
services.	 Capitation	 accounts	 for	 30%	of	GPs	 income	with	 the	 remaining	 70%	 for	 fee-for-
service	payment.	Patients	face	a	copayment.	The	reform	increased	GP	consultations,	patient	
satisfaction	 and	 reduced	waiting	 time	 for	 consultations	 from	 8.3	 to	 7.2	 days	 (Brekke	 and	
Straume	2016).	GPs	operating	in	more	competitive	markets	(proxied	by	available	patient	list	
slots)	have	higher	rates	of	referral	to	secondary	care	(Iversen	and	Ma	2011).		
Attempts	 to	 remove	 restrictions	 on	 GP	 competition	 have	 been	 contentious	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	Before	1998	GPs	negotiated	collectively	on	contractual	conditions,	divided	the	
market	through	sharing	agreements,	and	regulated	entry.	When	the	Dutch	Competition	Act	
was	introduced	in	1998,	GPs	came	under	scrutiny	of	the	competition	authority.	The	national	
GP	 association	 applied	 for	 an	 exemption	 from	 cartel	 prohibition,	 which	 was	 declined	 in	
2001.	There	was	a	strike	of	GPs	in	2005.	In	2011	the	competition	authority	imposed	a	fine	of	
7.7	million	Euro.	The	association	formally	objected,	though	in	2012	it	conceded	that	regional	
GP	associations	would	not	engage	in	collective	negotiations	about	price,	volume	and	service	
levels.	 In	 2015	 a	 court	 annulled	 the	 fine	 because	 the	 competition	 authority	 had	 failed	 to	
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provide	 sufficient	 evidence	 that	 the	 association	 had	 harmed	 quality	 by	 restricting	
competition	(Schut	and	Varkevisser	2016).	
Although	health	insurers	can	selectively	contract	with	GPs,	they	have	little	incentives	to	do	
so	since	prices	are	highly	regulated.	Patients	register	with	a	single	GP	practice	and	selective	
contracting	would	end	such	longstanding	relationships	(Schut	and	Varkevisser	2016).	
There	 is	 scope	 however	 for	 selective	 contracting	 in	 relation	 to	 bundled	 payments	 for	
patients	with	chronic	conditions.	In	2010	bundled	payments	were	introduced	nationwide	for	
diabetes	(type-II),	COPD	and	vascular	risks	to	support	primary	care	coordination	and	prevent	
specialist	visits	and	hospitalization.	Prices	are	negotiated	between	a	care	group	and	health	
insurers.	 Care	 groups	 are	 legal	 entities	 acting	 as	 contractors	 and	 employ	 or	 subcontract	
providers	to	offer	coordinated	outpatient	care.	There	are	about	100	groups,	with	a	median	
of	50	GPs	each,	covering	80%	of	GPs	(van	Dijk	et	al	2014).	A	study	showed	improvements	in	
organization	 and	 coordination	 of	 care,	 better	 protocol	 adherence	 for	 diabetes,	 but	
increased	administrative	costs	and	large	price	variations	not	explained	by	quality	(De	Bakker	
2012).	A	related	study	suggests	that	mortality	rates	also	fell	(Struijs	2015).		
The	number	of	groups	per	region	varies	between	1	and	13,	with	an	average	of	5	per	region.	
The	median	market	 share	 is	16%	and	 reaches	40%	 for	a	quarter	of	 groups	 (Van	Dijk	et	 al	
2014).	 Care	 groups	 compete	 for	 GPs	 since	 patients	 do	 not	 actively	 choose	 a	 group.	 One	
study	found	that	one	additional	group	reduced	contract	prices	for	diabetes	by	1.5%	(5	Euro,	
Van	Dijk	et	al	2014).	Regional	insurer	market	concentration	had	no	effect	on	price.	There	are	
large	 price	 variations,	 possibly	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 experience	 in	 negotiating	 contracts	 and	
uncertainty	 about	 care	 covered	 by	 the	 bundle	 (Schut	 and	 Varkevisser	 2016).	 Additional	
payments	are	being	considered	for	patients	with	depression	and	for	frail	elderly.	
In	Germany	 46%	of	doctors	working	 in	private	practices	 in	2012	were	GPs	and	54%	were	
specialists.	 Patients	 can	 generally	 access	 specialists	 without	 seeing	 a	 GP.	 However,	 from	
2007	 sickness	 funds	 need	 to	 sign	Gatekeeping	 Contracts,	 a	 form	 of	 selective	 contracting,	
with	a	partner	representing	more	than	50%	of	GPs	in	an	area,	often	the	German	Association	
of	Family	Physicians,	or	as	an	addition	to	contracts	with	the	regional	physician	association.	
The	 aim	 is	 to	 improve	 coordination	 of	 care	 and	 reduce	 costs.	 There	 are	 91	 contracts	
involving	16,500	GPs	covering	4	million	patients.	Contracts	use	a	mix	of	capitation	(60	Euro	
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per	patient)	and	fee-for-service.	Initial	evaluations	suggest	fewer	avoidable	hospitalisations	
and	 dangerous	 drug	 combinations,	 higher	 patient	 satisfaction,	 but	 more	 specialist	 visits,	
higher	pharmaceutical	expenditure	and	ambiguous	effects	on	costs	(Kifmann	2016).		
In	France	there	are	no	restrictions	on	patient	choice	of	GP.		66%	of	GPs	are	self-employed	
and	paid	by	fee-for-service.	 	Most	GPs	are	required	to	charge	regulated	fees	but	some	are	
permitted	 to	 charge	 above	 the	 regulated	 level.	 	 GP	 ability	 to	 overcharge	 has	 been	
constrained	since	1990.		
In	Portugal	patients	are	free	to	choose	a	GP	if	there	is	place	on	their	list.	Choice	is	however	
severely	constrained	by	excess	demand.	Some	residents	do	not	have	a	GP	since	all	local	lists	
are	full.	Patients	pay	user	fees	regulated	by	the	Government	but	can	visit	a	private	practice	
if	they	pay	out-of-pocket.		
	
Most	hospital	mergers	are	cleared	by	competition	authorities	
In	 France	 no	 merger	 case	 has	 concerned	 public	 hospitals.	 There	 have	 been	 90	 mergers	
between	 private	 hospitals	 since	 1995,	 mostly	 small	 or	 medium-size	 hospitals.	 All	 were	
cleared	 by	 the	 competition	 authority	 without	 further	 investigation	 of	 possible	 effects	 on	
quality.	Since	prices	are	regulated,	the	competition	authority	computes	local	market	shares	
to	 assess	 whether	 merging	 hospitals	 could	 reduce	 quality.	 In	 areas	 with	 limited	 private	
providers,	 the	 pressure	 from	 public	 hospitals	 has	 been	 considered	 sufficient	 to	 maintain	
competition.	Market	shares	are	defined	by	categories	of	services	such	as	obstetrics,	surgery,	
and	 long-term	care.	A	more	 segmented	grouping	by	Major	Diagnosis	Categories	has	been	
considered.	Catchment	areas	are	defined	with	a	radius	of	30	minutes’	driving	time,	though	it	
can	be	extended	depending	on	the	service	(Chone	2016).		
In	 the	Netherlands	up	 to	2015,	26	out	of	27	hospital	mergers	have	been	cleared	after	an	
initial	or	substantial	assessment.	The	general	rules	of	the	Competition	Act	apply	to	hospitals.	
In	 the	 first	 phase,	 the	 competition	 authority	 decides	 whether	 a	 license	 is	 needed	 if	 ‘‘a	
dominant	 position	 that	 appreciably	 restricts	 competition…’’	 arises.	 After	 a	 detailed	
assessment	 ‘‘A	 license	 shall	 be	 refused	 if,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 proposed	 concentration,	
effective	competition	 […]	would	be	appreciably	 impeded	…’’.	The	number	of	hospitals	has	
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steadily	declined	to	81	in	2015	with	hospitals	having	an	average	market	share	of	50%.	Some	
have	 argued	 that	 hospital	 merger	 policy	 is	 too	 permissive	 (Loozen	 et	 al	 2014).	 Although	
market	 shares	 can	 be	 computed,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 they	 are	 problematic	 since	 the	
patient	flows	on	which	market	shares	are	based	are	not	indicative	of	patients’	willingness	to	
travel	if	quality	differences	across	hospitals	are	not	transparent	to	patients.	As	a	result,	the	
competition	authority	has	not	specified	the	size	of	the	geographical	market	for	a	merger	to	
imply	a	reduction	in	competition.	In	the	only	prohibited	merger	the	merging	hospitals	were	
strong	 competitors	 and	 insurers	would	 have	 been	 left	with	 insufficient	 alternatives	when	
negotiating	with	 providers	 (Varkevisser	 and	 Schut	 2016;	 see	 also	 Schmid	 and	 Varkevisser	
2016).		
In	Germany	 hospital	mergers	 are	 subject	 to	 antitrust	 law	and	 should	be	prohibited	 if	 the	
merged	 firm	 obtains	 more	 than	 40%	 market	 share	 or	 if	 the	 merger	 leads	 to	 significant	
concentration	 (3	 or	 less	 firms	 with	 50%	market	 share,	 or	 5	 or	 less	 firms	 with	 66%).	 The	
competition	 authority	 defines	 the	market	 according	 to	 comparable	 services	 (eg	 acute	 or	
rehabilitative	 care)	 based	 on	 patient	 flows	 and	 travel	 time.	 182	 mergers	 were	 approved	
between	 2004-2014	 and	 7	 were	 prohibited.	 The	 largest	 approved	 merger	 related	 to	 a	
takeover	of	40	hospitals	by	private	chains.	The	 takeover	 initially	 involved	43	hospitals	but	
the	number	was	reduced	after	the	authority	raised	concerns	(Kifmann	2016).		
In	Portugal	the	competition	authority	has	jurisdiction	over	private	hospitals.	Most	decisions	
relate	to	acquisitions	of	small	hospitals	located	in	medium-sized	cities	by	large	groups.	The	
Health	 Regulatory	 Agency	 produces	 an	 opinion	 which	 is	 not	 binding	 on	 the	 competition	
authority.	 Hospital	 mergers	 within	 the	 NHS	 are	 seen	 as	 administrative	 acts.	 Mergers	 of	
private	 hospitals	 in	 different	 regions	 do	 not	 affect	 market	 concentration	 and	 raise	 no	
concern	(Barros	2016).		
In	Norway	competition	law	does	not	apply	to	state-owned	health	enterprises.	Private	non-
profit	or	for-profit	hospitals	are	subject	to	competition	litigation,	but	there	have	been	very	
few	cases.	
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Involvement	of	private	providers	is	widespread	
The	 involvement	of	private	providers	varies	across	 countries.	There	 is	a	mix	of	public	and	
private	 providers	 in	 Germany,	 France	 and	 Portugal.	 In	 Germany	 in	 2014	 about	 30%	 of	
hospitals	 were	 public,	 35%	 private	 non-profit	 hospitals	 and	 35%	 for-profit	 hospitals	 with	
many	owned	by	chains.	In	France	private	hospitals	provide	60%	of	surgery	and	co-exist	with	
public	 hospitals.	 In	Norway	 most	 hospitals	 are	 public.	 There	 are	 some	 private	 non-profit	
hospitals	providing	care	 for	public	patients	and	also	some	private	 for-profit	hospitals	with	
contracts	for	certain	treatments.	In	Portugal	private	providers	can	provide	services	to	both	
publicly-funded	 and	 privately-funded	 patients.	 Prices	 of	 publicly-funded	 treatments	 are	
negotiated	between	the	NHS	and	private	hospitals,	the	latter	often	organized	in	professional	
associations.	 Prices	 for	 privately-funded	 treatments	 are	 negotiated	with	 health	 insurance	
companies.	Private	hospitals	compete	on	price	and	quality	of	services	to	win	contracts	with	
insurance	companies	or	with	health	subsystems.		
Although	in	Portugal	hospital	competition	remains	limited,	competition	for	the	market	has	
been	 stimulated	 since	 2011	 through	 tendering	 processes.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 is	
developing	electronic	platforms	for	bidding	for	contracts.	Examples	include	pharmaceuticals	
and	hospital	products	(Barros	2016).		There	have	been	Public	Private	Partnerships	(PPP)	for	
the	construction	of	new	hospitals	since	2000	– another	form	of	competition	for	the	market.	
Hospitals	 managed	 by	 private	 entities	 under	 PPP	 contracts	 are	 part	 of	 the	 NHS.	 A	 key	
element	was	the	inclusion	of	clinical	services	in	addition	to	infrastructure	which	potentially	
gives	 scope	 to	 innovate,	 reduce	cost	and	 improve	quality.	Each	PPP	 involves	one	contract	
which	 relates	 to	building,	operating	and	maintaining	 the	 infrastructure	and	 lasts	30	years,	
and	one	 contract	 for	 clinical	 services	management	 lasting	 10	 years	with	 the	 possibility	 of	
renewal.	The	bidding	process	to	select	the	private	partner	involved	a	first	phase	with	sealed	
bids,	and	a	second	phase	between	the	two	best	bidders.	The	first	wave	of	PPPs	covered	ten	
planned	new	hospitals,	of	which	four	are	now	open.	No	major	renegotiations	took	place	in	
the	first	decade.	Quality	is	controlled	by	indicators	specified	in	the	contract	and	fines	have	
been	applied	by	the	public	sector	when	these	were	not	respected	(Barros	2016).		
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4.	Discussion	and	key	policy	lessons	
Policies	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 competition	 in	 the	 health	 sector	 may	 focus	 on	 demand	
(patients)	or	supply	(hospitals	and	GPs)	or	both.	For	example,	patient	choice	policies	aim	at	
removing	restrictions	on	the	set	of	providers	available	to	patients	and	so	encourage	them	to	
improve	 quality.	 Policies	 that	 influence	 hospitals’	 revenues,	 such	 the	 introduction	 of	DRG	
pricing,	act	more	explicitly	on	supply	but	work	in	conjunction	with	patient	choice	since	DRG	
pricing	is	only	beneficial	to	hospitals	if	they	can	attract	extra	patients.	The	effects	of	policies	
are	further	mediated	by	market	structure	reflected	in	the	distribution	of	the	providers	over	
geography	 (eg	 rural	 versus	 metropolitan	 areas)	 and	 over	 time	 as	 reflected	 by	 waves	 of	
provider	consolidations,	mergers	and	closures.	Policies	aimed	at	enhancing	competition	are	
therefore	best	seen	as	a	portfolio	of	interdependent	tools,	aimed	at	patients,	the	providers	
and	the	markets	through	which	they	interact.	
Patients’	 choice	 policies	 are	 increasingly	 popular	with	 information	 on	 quality	 increasingly	
available	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 in	 France,	 Norway	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 There	 is	 some	
evidence	that	demand	responds	to	these	published	quality	indicators	in	the	Netherlands.	In	
Norway	 patients	 are	 likely	 to	 bypass	 local	 hospitals	 following	 the	 introduction	 of	 patient	
choice.	These	findings	are	consistent	with	existing	limited	empirical	literature,	mostly	from	
the	US	and	the	UK	(Brekke	et	al	2014),	which	suggests	that	distance	to	hospital	 is	 the	key	
determinant	 of	 choice.	 Whilst	 hospitals	 with	 higher	 quality	 are	 rewarded	 with	 more	
patients,	the	response	to	higher	quality	–	the	quality	elasticity	of	demand	–	 is	quite	small.	
Patients	with	higher	socioeconomic	status	are	more	likely	to	exert	choice.		
There	are	design	 issues	 in	relation	to	the	quality	 indicators	provided	in	the	public	domain.	
Countries	differ	in	the	amount	and	type	of	information	they	produce.	For	example	in	France	
only	process	measures	of	quality	are	provided.		
Patients’	choice	policies	are	still	at	an	early	stage	of	development.	There	 is	scope	to	make	
indicators	more	 accessible	 to	 patients	 and	more	 relevant	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 choice.	 Since	
patients’	 choices	 of	 hospital	 are	 generally	 made	 in	 consultation	 with	 their	 GP,	 even	 in	
systems	without	gatekeeping,	policy	design	needs	to	take	the	GP	role	into	account.		
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Hospital	 competition	 on	 quality	 for	 publicly-funded	 patients	 is	 present	 in	 all	 countries	
reviewed	except	Portugal	where	patients	are	generally	restricted	to	their	local	hospital.	The	
extent	of	competition	and	the	institutional	set-up	differs	significantly.	Policymakers	have	a	
menu	of	 policy	 options	 in	 relation	 to	 hospital	 competition,	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 how	
prices	 are	 determined.	 For	 example,	 prices	 are	 fixed	 and	 centrally	 determined	 in	 France,	
subject	 to	negotiations	between	 insurers	and	hospitals	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	collectively	
negotiated	between	insurers	and	professional	associations	in	Germany.		
DRG	prices	 are	 normally	 set	 to	 reflect	 past	 average	hospital	 costs.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	
Norway	where	 the	 price	 reflects	 only	 40%	 to	 60%	 of	 average	 cost	 and	 is	 determined	 by	
parliament	each	year	 through	the	political	process.	DRG	prices	below	average	costs	might	
help	 in	mitigating	excessive	 incentives	 to	 increase	 volumes,	 a	 common	concern	with	DRG	
systems,	but	also	hinders	quality	competition	since	hospital	profit	margins	 from	attracting	
additional	 patients	 are	 reduced	 or	might	 be	 negative.	 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 concerns	 over	
expenditure	have	 led	 to	 the	 introduction	of	 a	macro	budget	 instrument	which	potentially	
penalises	 all	 hospital	 revenues	 if	 the	 target	 expenditure	 is	 exceeded.	 In	 practice,	 this	 has	
meant	 that	 health	 insurers	 have	 also	 introduced	 expenditure	 caps,	 which	 in	 turn	 also	
reduces	 hospitals’	 incentives	 to	 compete	 on	 quality.	 In	 Germany	 although	 prices	 are	
collectively	negotiated,	there	are	no	restrains	on	hospital	volume	and	hospitals	in	principle	
compete	on	quality.		
There	 is	 generally	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 the	 case	 studies	 whether	 hospital	
competition	increases	quality	under	fixed	price	regulation	or	when	prices	are	negotiated	(as	
in	the	Netherlands).	The	only	exception	is	France	for	which	there	is	evidence	that	public	and	
private	 hospitals	 treating	 publicly-funded	 patients	 do	 compete	 for	 patients	 on	 non-price	
attributes.	 Although	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 general	 support	 for	 policies	 stimulating	 hospital	
quality	competition,	some	concerns	have	also	been	raised.	In	France	in	particular	it	has	been	
suggested	 that	 competition	 may	 hinder	 collaboration.	 There	 have	 been	 consequent	
attempts	to	combine	competition	and	cooperation	across	hospitals	with	teaching	hospitals	
leading	and	coordinating	groups	of	public	hospitals.			
Choice	 and	 competition	 policies	 for	 GPs	 have	 mixed	 support	 across	 countries.	 Norway	
introduced	GP	choice	 in	2001	and	combined	 it	with	an	element	of	 fee-for-service	 to	align	
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patients	 and	 doctors	 incentives.	 There	 is	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 policy	 led	 to	 GPs	
being	more	 responsive	 to	 patients.	 In	 contrast,	 attempts	 by	 the	 competition	 authority	 to	
remove	 restrictions	 on	 GP	 entry	 and	 competition	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 have	 been	 strongly	
resisted	by	GPs	and	have	been	controversial.	The	example	highlights	the	importance	of	the	
political	process	when	introducing	such	policies.		
There	 are	 no	 formal	 restrictions	 on	 GP	 choice	 in	 the	 Portuguese,	 French	 and	 German	
system.	In	Portugal	however	choice	is	severely	hindered	by	GP	shortages	with	some	patients	
not	being	able	to	register	with	a	GP.	GPs	have	a	stronger	gatekeeping	role	 in	Norway,	the	
Netherlands	and	Portugal,	and	a	weaker	one	in	France.	In	Germany	gatekeeping	is	still	being	
developed.	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 patients	 registered	 with	 gatekeeping	 GPs	
experienced	fewer	hospital	admissions	but,	somewhat	surprisingly,	visited	specialists	more	
frequently.		
Some	 countries	 like	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 have	 recently	 introduced	 innovative	
selective	contracting	aimed	at	patients	with	chronic	conditions.	The	aim	is	to	address	the	
segmentation	of	care	pathway.	This	is	a	form	of	competition	for	the	market,	as	opposed	to	
in	the	market.	The	arrangements	differ	across	countries.	In	the	Netherlands	health	insurers	
contracted	with	networks	of	GPs.	In	Germany	sickness	funds	contract	with	ambulatory	care	
providers.	 There	 are	 unresolved	 design	 questions.	Horizontal	 competition	 can	 hinder	 vertical	
integration	 by	 increasing	 the	 segmentation	 of	 care	 pathways,	 but	 policymakers	 can	 introduce	
vertical	competition	between	integrated	care	pathway	providers.		
Hospital	mergers	 are	 increasingly	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	by	 competition	 authorities.	 Even	 for	
countries	where	hospital	DRG	tariffs	are	fixed	and	hospitals	cannot	collude	on	price,	there	
are	 concerns	 that	quality	may	 suffer	 following	a	merger.	 In	 France,	Norway	and	Portugal,	
mergers	 between	 public	 hospitals	 are	 treated	 as	 administrative	 acts	 and	 internal	
reorganisations	 of	 public	 services,	 and	 not	 subject	 to	 authorisation	 from	 the	 competition	
authority.	 This	 is	not	 the	 case	 for	private	hospitals,	 though	 the	 vast	majority	of	proposed	
mergers	have	been	approved	on	the	ground	that	markets	would	still	exhibit	sufficient	choice	
and	 competition	 from	 the	 remaining	 rivals.	 Occasionally,	 mergers	 have	 been	 stopped	 if	
there	 were	 significant	 concerns	 over	 potential	 reductions	 in	 quality.	 But	 both	measuring	
quality	and	predicting	the	effects	of	mergers	on	it	will	remain	the	key	challenge	in	assessing	
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mergers	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	 The	 rationale	 for	 exempting	 public	 hospitals	 from	 the	
scrutiny	 of	 competition	 authorities	 is	 unclear.	 Hospital	 competition	 policies	 encourage	
hospitals	to	compete	on	quality,	and	it	would	seem	a	natural	concern	that	quality	may	suffer	
as	a	result	of	a	merger	between	private	or	public	hospitals.		
Countries	differ	in	the	mix	of	public	and	private	hospital	provision	and	the	evidence	on	the	
effect	 of	 ownership	 on	 quality	 is	 mixed	 (Herrera	 et	 al	 2014).	 In	 France,	 Germany	 and	
Portugal	 (and	to	a	much	 lesser	extent	 in	Norway)	public	and	private	providers	coexist	and	
compete	for	the	same	patients.	A	contentious	issue	in	France	has	been	whether	both	types	
of	provider	should	be	paid	with	the	same	DRG	tariff	with	private	providers	currently	being	
paid	less.	It	raises	a	general	issue	of	what	constitutes	an	appropriate	pricing	when	different	
types	of	providers	treat	publicly-funded	patients,	given	their	different	objectives,	obligations	
(eg	 the	provision	of	 an	 emergency	department	 in	 public	 hospitals),	 regulatory	 constraints	
(VAT,	pension	contributions,	access	 to	capital)	and	abilities	 to	 treat	 less	complex	cases.	 In	
Portugal	private	hospitals	have	been	built	under	Public	Private	Partnerships	to	the	benefit	of	
publicly-funded	patients.	Private	providers	can	be	an	integral	part	of	publicly-funded	health	
systems	 either	 for	 historical	 reasons,	 to	 augment	 public	 capacity	 at	 times	 of	 financial	
constraints,	or	to	introduce	some	contestability	in	the	market	of	public	providers.	
	
5.	Conclusions	
This	 study	 shows	 how	 policies	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	 competition	 are	 multifaceted.	 It	
illustrates	 how	 competition	 can	 have	 different	 implications	 depending	 on	 the	 service	
(primary	or	secondary),	 the	dimension	on	which	providers	compete	(quality	and/or	price),	
market	structure,	and	the	diversity	of	providers	(eg	for-profit	versus	non-profit).		
Policies	to	promote	competition	are	a	relatively	recent	development	in	most	countries	and	
there	 is	 a	 dearth	 of	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 their	 intended	 and	 unintended	 effects.	 In	
particular,	we	know	very	little	regarding	their	effects	on	quality.	The	problems	in	developing	
and	accessing	good	information	on	quality	are	exemplified	by	the	difficulty	that	competition	
authorities	have	in	assessing	the	effect	of	a	proposed	merger	on	quality.	Similarly,	although	
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selective	contracting	 is	 supposed	to	act	on	quality	and	price,	most	negotiations	ultimately	
revolve	around	prices.		
Finally,	 although	 policies	which	 enhance	 competition	 can	 potentially	 play	 a	 useful	 role	 in	
driving	up	quality	and	driving	down	costs,	 ideally	 they	should	be	assessed	alongside	other		
policy	levers,	such	as	pay-for-performance,	quality	rating	and	auditing	mechanisms,	though	
such	assessment	still	requires	good	information	on	quality.		
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Table	1.	Overview	of	key	policies	
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